Thursday, September 11, 2008

The Great Secular Consensus

I was recently reading "Quam Dilecta" by Peter Van Inwagen, the first part of which is a semi-autobiography, and found this paragraph quite interesting:

I know that sneers directed at God and the Church, which--I hope I am not giving away any secret here--are very common in the academy, were becoming intolerable to me. (What was especially intolerable was the implied invitation to join in, the absolutely unexamined assumption that, because I was a member of the academic community, I would, of course, regard sneering at God and the Church as meet, right, and even my bounden duty.) I perhaps did not have anything like a desire to turn to Christ as my Savior, or a desire to lead a godly, righteous, and sober life, but I did have a strong desire to belong to a Christian community of discourse, a community in which it was open to people to talk to each other in words like the ones that Lewis addresses to his correspondent in Letters to an American Lady. I envied people who could talk to one another in those terms. I know that I was becoming more and more repelled by the "great secular consensus" that comprises the world-view of just about everyone connected with the universities, journalism, the literary and artistic intelligentsia, and the entertainment industry. I knew that, confused as I might be about many things, I was quite clear about one thing: I could not bear the thought of being a part of that consensus. What made it so repulsive to me can be summed up in a schoolyard cri de coeur: "They think they're so smart!" I was simply revolted by the malevolent, self-satisfied stupidity of the attacks on Christianity that proceeded from the consensus.
Van Inwagen is talking about the 80's here. Do his comments still hold true today?  There has been, as many people are pointing out, a revival in Christian philosophy, but how far does this revival actually stretch?

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Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Thesis Proposals

1. The Culture of Congestion: Complexity and Complication

In Delirious New York, Rem Koolhaas writes that “the original promise of the metropolitan condition” is the “Culture of Congestion,”[1] which is a culture that is premised on conflict, complication, and a continuously changing skyline.  Buildings as ideology constantly rise and fall, and the experience of this energy keeps the metropolis alive.  Jackson, MS lacks all of these characteristics and consequently is a dead metropolis.  This thesis is a proposal to reinvigorate Jackson with complication and complexity.  The city needs to be layered with conflicting patterns of ideas, circulation, functions, aspirations, successes, and failures.  We do not simply need urban density, but rather a culture of continuous change and conflict.[2]

This project contains an epistemological counterpart, one in which the city actually becomes part of epistemology.  A polemic on healthy epistemology is a manifesto for a successful city.  A paper is already in the process.  This paper will explore the city as a model for knowledge, the epistemopolis, by looking at two postmodern, relativistic epistemological options and their accompanying architectures: anti-utopian epistemology and anarchic epistemology.  Does the abandonment of absolutes in the epistemopolis necessitate a full blown eclecticism where judgments can no longer be made about the built environment?  Is our only choice suburban sprawl and cheap, poorly stylized strip malls?  In answering these questions, the conflict between the east and west coasts of America, Los Angeles and New York, emerges at the heart of the debate.  These two cities represent the extremes of the epistemopolis, one sprawling and without epistemic garbage and one bound to a small island and full of conflict, complication, and epistemic waste.  In the end, Koolhaas’s New York, and its accompanying anarchy, is shown to be the superior epistemic and urban option, and thus this thesis project becomes an attempt to validate a position on knowledge.

The Culture of Congestion is not created by any one architect, planner, capitalist, or bureaucrat—it is not Eisenman’s counterfeit complexity.  Chaos is not constructed from a single ideological viewpoint.  Rather, this project will be an attempt to encourage and breed mania by setting up the right systems and examples to purposefully cause conflict and schizophrenia.  Achieving complication includes many significant concepts: the layering of information, the relation of architecture and the digital environment, junkspace, and the relationship of diversity to standardization.  Although the method of accomplishing congestion is not certain, possibilities include: light rail systems, mixed-use buildings, megastructures, junkspace™,[3] public structures and spaces, and modifications to infrastructure.

2. Rhizomes: Building the Chaosmos 

“Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterrritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature.”[4]  Binary logic is the logic of a tree, a centralized and grounded object, one which is familiar to most of us today in the various forms of modernism and critical theory.  It is organized, rationalized, “scientific”, and linear.  In contrast, rhizomes, systems that have no central core or specific starting point, are multiplicities, or varieties, of elements that have no unit of measure.  They are chaos.  The world is no longer (or never was) cosmos, it is chaosmos.[5] Rhizomes are not made up of points, but rather of lines.  Rhizomes are always between a beginning and an end, never at them.[6]  As Deleuze as Guattari write, “the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight.”[7]

This thesis simply asks how we make rhizomatic architecture.  It should be noted immediately that chaos does not by any means imply random or lackadaisical architecture.  It is, instead, a mode of building in the world that embraces multiplicity, change, and flow.  Integral to a chaos approach will be the rejection of architecture dualism: e.g. form and space cannot be considered opposites.  Architecture that is the result of rhizomatic logic is unresolved, varying, and mutable.  It is not about the fixed idea, but rather process and events—it is about path.  This thesis is not driven by a desire to create formal or spatial chaos for its own sake—it is not an attempt join the idiomatic fad of post-structuralist style.  Rather, it is an attempt to find and create rhizomes in the urban environment through multiple approaches.  Deleuze and Guattari find rhizomes in technology, music, the oceans, math, war, and art, so we should be able to find rhizomes in architecture through program, aesthetics, utility, phenomenology, structure, infrastructure, light, shadows, etc.  This project is conceived as an urban intervention with no specific place or name.  It will simply be architectural artifacts (public facilities, transportation systems, monuments?) that are involved in the fabric of State St.  The goal is to create architecture that defies clear attempts at categorization (this idea will be expounded upon from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of smooth and striated space)[8] because it always pushes back and flows against binary logic.

3. Delaying the Rush to Meaning: Revising Phenomenology

Phenomenology as an architectural method clearly, and rightly so, finds strong affinities with the spatial and experiential aspects of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, and consequently much of related architectural practice and theory has focused on sensational qualities such as light, color, perspective, movement, time, and sound.[9]  Through the method of bracketing, the transcendental reduction allows Merleau-Ponty to resolve the need for primordial description in ontology by the use of the doctrine of “primacy of perception” that situates being in phenomenon.  The focus on the primacy of perception is the bridge that has led the phenomenological approach to architecture to focus on the experience of phenomenon, and bracket off other issues.  I would like to suggest here that the real project of phenomenology in architecture should be considered much larger in scope. Limiting “phenomenological architecture” to the work of people such as Peter Zumthor, Steven Holl, and Juhanni Pallasmaa, in contrast to other contemporary architects such as Coop Himmelb(l)au, Herzog and De Meuron, or Rem Koolhaas is not only detrimental, but possibly even the eventual nail in the coffin for phenomenology as architectural theory.

Gilles Deleuze’s criticism of phenomenology[10] actually provides a means for criticizing the tendency to narrow the scope of phenomenology.  According to Deleuze, phenomenology assumes the world to be “primordially impregnated with univocal meaning,”[11] thus reinstating axiomatic thinking.  However correct, Deleuze’s criticism does not spell the end of phenomenology, for the robust ontology of the flesh laid out by Merleau-Ponty provides a serious response and even companion to Deleuze’s notions of paradox and multiplicity.[12] In light of Deleuze’s criticism and a focus on Merleau-Ponty’s later work, I would like to characterize the real goal of architectural phenomenology as the creation of architecture that leaves the door open on univalent interpretation as long as possible so as to delay the collapse of meaning and to allow the freedom of expression and imagination.[13]  Architectural phenomenology does not simply find its roots in the visible and the sensuous, but also the invisible.  This characterization should suggest the application of phenomenological theory in a number of different ways and should lead architects and architecture theorists to address concepts such as unnameability, complication, paradox, chaos, and multiplicity as facets of phenomenology.  As Merleau-Ponty writes, “movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves, return toward their source and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, begin the paradox of expression.”[14] 

The work of this thesis then is to reject phenomenology as simply a product of over expressed and over emphasized phenomena, and, instead, suggest that architecture should be engaged in delaying the collapse of meaning.  Building an architecture that slows the move towards meaning would involve an attempt to use both phenomena and meaning based conventions to explore multiplicity, unnameability, paradox and chaos.  This thesis could be executed with any sort of program, but greater success may be possible with a larger scale, public building, which will allow a freer exploration of slowing meaning in a social setting.



[1] Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto, 293.

[2] Delirious New York, 296.

[3] Rem Koolhaas, “Junkspace,” October 100, Spring 2002, pp.175-190.

[4] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 21.

[5] Deleuze and Guattari, 7.  Also, a move from psychoanalysis to schizoanalysis (17-18).

[6]Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its bands and picks up speed in the middle” (25).

[7] Deleuze and Guattari, 21.

[8] Deleuze and Guattari, 474-500.

[9] For example, see Steven Holl, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture, San Francisco, William Stout Publishers, 2006.  The majority of this book is devoted to addressing phenomenology in this very way.

[10] For his discussions on phenomenology, see What is Philosophy?, Difference and Repetition. The Logic of Sense, And Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.

[11] Reynolds, Jack, and Jon Roffe. "Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity and Phenomenology," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37, no. 3 (October 01, 2006), 230.

[12] Several recent pieces of work have suggested a connection between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: 

Henry Somers-Hall, "Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: The Aesthetics of Difference," Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy (Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale) 10, no. 1 (March 01, 2006), 213-221.

 Leonard Lawlor, "The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty," Continental Philosophy Review 31, no. 1 (January 01, 1998), 15-34.

[13] There are certain affinities of this definition with the work of Rachel McCann in Wild Being and Carnal Echo: The Experience and Design of Architecture in the Flesh, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Architectural Association School of Architecture, London.

[14] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude Lefort, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1968, 144.

Sunday, August 31, 2008

Meaning and the Making of Multiplicity

Broadening the Scope of Architectural Phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze

(Abstract)

Phenomenology as an architectural method clearly, and rightly so, finds strong affinities with the spatial and experiential aspects of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, and consequently much of related architectural practice and theory has focused on sensational qualities such as light, color, perspective, movement, time, and sound.[1]Through the method of bracketing, the transcendental reduction allows Merleau-Ponty to resolve the need for primordial description in ontology by the use of the doctrine of “primacy of perception” that situates being in phenomenon. The focus on the primacy of perception has led the phenomenological approach to architecture to focus on experience, and bracket off other issues. I would like to suggest here that the real project of phenomenology in architecture should be considered much larger in scope. Limiting “phenomenological architecture” to the work of people such as Peter Zumthor, Steven Holl, and Juhanni Pallasmaa, in contrast to other contemporary architects such as Coop Himmelb(l)au, Herzog and De Meuron, or Rem Koolhaas is not only detrimental, but possibly even the eventual nail in the coffin for phenomenology as architectural theory.

Giles Deleuze’s criticism of phenomenology[2] actually provides a means for criticizing the tendency to narrow the scope of phenomenology. According to Deleuze, phenomenology assumes the world to be “primordially impregnated with univocal meaning," [3] thus reinstating axiomatic thinking. However correct, Deleuze’s criticism does not spell the end of phenomenology, for the robust ontology of the flesh laid out by Merleau-Ponty provides a serious response and even companion to Deleuze’s notions of paradox and multiplicity.[4] In light of Deleuze’s criticism and a focus on Merleau-Ponty’s later work, I would like to characterize the real goal of architectural phenomenology as the creation of architecture that leaves the door open on univalent interpretation as long as possible so as to delay the collapse of meaning and to allow the freedom of expression and imagination.[5] This characterization should suggest the application of phenomenological theory in a number of different ways, and should also suggest that architects and architecture theorists address concepts such as unnameability, complication, paradox, chaos, and multiplicity as facets of phenomenology. Architectural phenomenology does not simply find its roots in the visible and the sensuous, but also the invisible. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves, return toward their source and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, begin the paradox of expression."[6]

[1] For example, see Steven Holl, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture, San Francisco, William Stout Publishers, 2006.The majority of this book is devoted to addressing phenomenology in this very way.

[2] For his discussions on phenomenology, see What is Philosophy?, Difference and Repetition. The Logic of Sense, And Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.

[3] Reynolds, Jack, and Jon Roffe. "Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity and Phenomenology," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37, no. 3 (October 01, 2006), 230.

[4] Several recent pieces of work have suggested a connection between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty:

Henry Somers-Hall, "Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: The Aesthetics of Difference," Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy (Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale) 10, no. 1 (March 01, 2006), 213-221.

Leonard Lawlor, "The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty," Continental Philosophy Review 31, no. 1 (January 01, 1998), 15-34.

[5] There are certain affinities of this definition with the work of Rachel McCann in Wild Being and Carnal Echo: The Experience and Design of Architecture in the Flesh, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Architectural Association School of Architecture, London.

[6] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude Lefort, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1968, 144.

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Philosophers' Carnival LXXVI

.... is here.

Blogged with the Flock Browser

Saturday, August 09, 2008

Paper: Knowledge as the Metropolis

I've just uploaded a more recent, but still rough, draft of my paper "Knowledge as the Metropolis: Anti-Utopia, Anarchy, and the Epistemological Picture" although it is still a little convoluted (especially section 4).  Any thoughts?


Abstract:
Epistemology, while largely an attempt to deal with the incorporeal, has not escaped the grasps of material, architectural terminology and analogy. Recent philosophy has witnessed the fall of Foundationalism into disrepute and Modern architecture has gone along with it. If modernism is indeed dead, what counter-epistemologies and architectures can be advanced? Many reactionary epistemologies embrace some sort of relativism, which is nothing new (similar views can be traced back through Aristotle), but what does relativism necessarily entail? Does a response to scientism require a vicious sort of relativism that lacks ambition and embraces everything? Does the abandonment of univalence in architecture necessitate a full blown eclecticism where judgments can no longer be made about the built environment? Is our only choice suburban sprawl and cheap, poorly-stylized strip malls? By examining two postmodern alternatives, anti-utopian and anarchic epistemologies, I explore the architecture of relativistic epistemology and suggest a possible alternative to foundations.